

Resurrecting the Extensive Margin

Monique Ebell
Humboldt University of Berlin

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Shimer, et. al.


- Recent debate about cyclical properties of labor market variables in MP models
 - Inelastic labor supply
 - **Quantitative** issues
- Once a participation margin is added to MP models
 - **Quantitative** issues
 - **Qualitative** issues

The Extensive Margin

- Previous authors found that combining
 - Technology shocks
 - MP labor search frictions
 - Elastic labor supply along extensive (participation) margin
- Procyclical unemployment
- Positively sloped Beveridge curve [unemployment and vacancies positively correlated]
- Limits use of search frictions in business cycle models.


What Goes Wrong?

- Elastic labor supply along extensive margin
 - Workers enter labor force via search in response to changes in wages and job-finding rates



- Positive technology shock leads to:
 - Workers flowing into search (unemployment) from out-of-labor-force
 - Increase in unemployment on impact
 - Firms increase vacancies
 - Little increase in job-finding rates

Impulse-Response: High Elasticity



How to Get it Right

- Previous authors [Veracierto (2002), Tripiier (2003), Ravn (2005)] either
 - assume utility linear in labor/leisure time
 - choose labor supply elasticity to **target employment volatility**
- This paper
 - chooses labor supply elasticity to **target participation volatility**

How to Get it Right


- Participation $p_t = u_t + h_t$

- Employment vs. Participation Volatility

$$\boxed{p^2 \sigma_p^2} = u^2 \sigma_u^2 + \boxed{h^2 \sigma_h^2} + 2hu \operatorname{cov}(u, h)$$

- The two targets would only be equivalent if model generated equal
 - Unemployment volatility σ_u YES
 - Correlation between Unemployment and Employment $\rho_{u,h}$ NO


Impulse-Response: Target σ_ρ



How to Get it Right, 2

- Wage volatility
 - Shimer vs. Hagedorn/Manovskii
 - If wages too elastic w.r.t. productivity, then vacancies increase about as much as unemployment → little increase in job-finding rates
 - Here, target wage volatility to match data
- Time Aggregation
 - weekly, not quarterly calibration
 - unemployment has procyclical impact at weekly frequency, but not quarterly

Wage Volatility High, Target p



Outline

1. Introduction
2. Model
3. Calibration
4. Quantitative Results

Households' Problem

- Large family solves
$$\max E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[\ln c_t + \phi \frac{l_t^{1-\frac{1}{\nu}}}{1-\frac{1}{\nu}} \right]$$

subject to budget and time constraints:

$$w_t h_t + r_t k_{t-1} + \pi_t \geq c_t + i_t$$

$$1 = h_t + u_t + l_t$$

$$k_t = (1 - \delta) k_{t-1} + i_t$$

$$h_{t+1} = (1 - \chi) h_t + f_t u_t$$

Households' Euler Equations

- Participation

$$\underbrace{u_{l,t}}_{\phi l^{\frac{1}{\nu}}} = f_t \beta E_t \left\{ w_{t+1} u_{c,t+1} - u_{l,t+1} + u_{l,t+1} \frac{1-\chi}{f_{t+1}} \right\}$$

- Consumption

$$u_{c,t} = \beta E_t \left\{ u_{c,t+1} [r_{t+1} + 1 - \delta] \right\}$$

Labor Search

- Standard MP search framework
- CRS Matching Function $m(U_t, V_t) = U_t^\eta V_t^{1-\eta}$
- Job finding rate $f(\theta_t) = \frac{m(U_t, V_t)}{U_t} = \theta_t^{1-\eta}$
- Job filling rate $q(\theta_t) = \frac{m(U_t, V_t)}{V_t} = \theta_t^{-\eta}$
- Labor market tightness $\theta_t \equiv \frac{V_t}{U_t}$

Worker's Values

- Value of Employment

$$V^E_t = w_t - u_l(c_t, l_t) + E_t \left\{ \tilde{\beta}_{t+1} \left[(1 - \chi)V^E_{t+1} + \chi V^U_{t+1} \right] \right\}$$

- Value of Unemployment

$$V^U_t = b - u_l(c_t, l_t) + E_t \left\{ \tilde{\beta}_{t+1} \left[f_t V^E_{t+1} + (1 - f_t)V^U_{t+1} \right] \right\}$$

→ Worker's Surplus

$$V^W_t = w_t - b + (1 - \chi - f_t) E_t \left\{ \tilde{\beta}_{t+1} V^W_{t+1} \right\}$$

Firm's Problem

- Firms solve:

$$V^J(z_t, h_t) = \max_{v_t, i_t} y_t - w_t h_t - r_t k_{t-1} - \kappa v_t + E_t \left\{ \tilde{\beta}_{t+1} V^J(z_{t+1}, h_{t+1}) \right\}$$

subject to

production function: $y_t = A e^{z_t} k_{t-1}^\alpha h_t^{1-\alpha}$

transition h_t : $h_t = (1 - \chi) h_{t-1} + q_t v_t$

wage curve: $w_t = w(h_t, z_t)$

technology shock: $z_t = \rho z_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$

Firm's Optimality

- Capital $r_t = f_k(z_t, k_{t-1}, h_t)$
- Vacancies $\frac{\kappa}{q_t} = E_t \left\{ \tilde{\beta}_{t+1} V_h^J(h_{t+1}, z_{t+1}) \right\}$
- Envelope h_t $V_h^J(z_t, h_t) = f_h(z_t, h_t, k_{t-1}) - w_t + (1 - \chi) \frac{\kappa}{q_t}$

→ *Euler Equation Labor*

$$\frac{\kappa}{q_t} = E_t \left\{ \tilde{\beta}_{t+1} \left[f_h(z_{t+1}, h_{t+1}, k_t) - w_{t+1} + (1 - \chi) \frac{\kappa}{q_{t+1}} \right] \right\}$$

Individual Wage Bargaining

- Individual bargaining with multi-worker firm
- Firm's surplus is marginal value of worker
- Nash bargaining problem

$$\max_{w_t} \mu \ln V^W_t + (1 - \mu) \ln \frac{\partial V^J(h_t, z_t)}{\partial h_t}$$

→ Wage curve

$$w_t = (1 - \mu)b + \mu \left[f_h(k_{t-1}, h_t, z_t) + \kappa \theta_t \right]$$

Equilibrium

- Sequence of wages and tightnesses $\{\theta_t, w_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ that satisfy
 - HH's Euler equations
 - Firm's optimality conditions
 - Firm's and HH's constraints
 - Wage curve
 - Transition for aggregate unemployment
 - Market Clearing
- 13 log-linear equations in the 13 unknowns $(h_t, l_t, k_t, f_t, q_t, \theta_t, u_t, v_t, w_t, y_t, c_t, i_t, z_t)$

Calibration

- Key element: Use participation volatility σ_p to pin down participation elasticity ν
- Otherwise: Similar to Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006)


Baseline Calibration: Weekly

Parameter	Value	Inelastic	Target
A	1.0	1.0	normalization
v	0.0058	—	$\sigma_{p/y} = 0.20$
ρ	0.9895	0.9895	data
σ_{ε}	0.34	0.34	data
χ	0.0081	0.0081	$u = 5.5\%, f = 0.139$
$\tilde{\beta}$	$0.988^{1/12}$	$0.988^{1/12}$	$\tilde{r} = 4.0\%$ annually
δ	0.0026	0.0026	$\frac{i}{y} = 0.25$
η	0.50	0.50	data range
μ	0.122	0.087	$\sigma_{w/y} = 0.42$
α	0.347	0.347	$\Pi_k = 34.74\%$
κ	0.29	0.29	data
m	0.175	0.175	$\theta = 1.8, f = 0.139$
$\frac{b}{w}$	0.956	0.970	$\Pi_l = 64.00\%$


Baseline Results: Correlations

Variable	Data	Target p	Target h	Veraciento
$\rho(u, y)$	-0.88	-0.85	0.26	0.22
$\rho(u, v)$	-0.97	-0.49	1.00	—
$\rho(u, h)$	-0.95	-0.96	-0.07	—
$\sigma_{w/y}$	0.42	0.42	0.42	—
$\sigma_{p/y}$	0.20	0.20	0.62	0.58
$\sigma_{h/y}$	0.60	0.44	0.60	0.56
μ	—	0.122	0.737	—
v	—	0.0058	0.38	—

Impulse-Response: Target σ_p



Impulse-Responses: Target σ_h



Baseline Results: Volatilities

Variable	Data	Target p	Target h	Veracierto
$\rho(u, v)$	-0.97	-0.49	1.00	—
$\sigma_{\theta/z}$	19.1	13.2	0.7	—
$\sigma_{u/z}$	9.5	5.9	6.6	4.9 ¹⁾
$\sigma_{v/z}$	10.1	9.2	6.9	—
$\sigma_{c/y}$	0.61	0.29	0.33	0.31
$\sigma_{i/y}$	3.79	3.08	3.13	4.50
$\sigma_{h/y}$	0.60	0.44	0.60	0.56
μ	—	0.122	0.737	—
$\frac{b}{w}$	—	0.956	0.970	—

Sensitivity: Volatilities

Impact of Participation Margin

Variable	Data	Target $\sigma_{p/y}$	Inelastic	HM
$\rho(u, y)$	-0.88	-0.85	-0.96	–
$\rho(u, v)$	-0.97	-0.49	-0.81	-0.97
$\rho(u, h)$	-0.95	-0.96	-1.00	–
$\sigma_{\theta/z}$	19.1	13.2	18.1	22.5
$\sigma_{u/z}$	9.5	5.9	8.1	11.2
$\sigma_{v/z}$	10.1	9.2	10.9	13.0
$\sigma_{w/y}$	0.42	0.42	0.42	–
$\sigma_{p/y}$	0.20	0.20	–	–
μ	–	0.122	0.087	0.052
$\frac{b}{w}$	–	0.956	0.970	0.955

Consumption-Tightness Puzzle

- In a nearly identical model, Ravn (2006) derives a relationship between c_t and θ_t :

$$\theta_t = \frac{1-\mu}{\mu} \frac{1}{\kappa} \frac{u_{l,t}}{u_{c,t}}$$

but he assumes a utility function that is linear in leisure:

$$u(c_t, l_t) = c_t^{1-\eta} / (1-\eta) - \phi h_t$$

→ Linear relationship between volatilities of c_t and θ_t

High,
23.7 %

$$\sigma(\hat{\theta}_t) = \eta \cdot \sigma(\hat{c}_t)$$

Low,
1.23 %

Reducing the Puzzle

- Now take utility function that allows for finite elasticity of participation:

$$u(c_t, l_t) = \frac{c_t^{1-\eta}}{1-\eta} - \phi \frac{l_t^{1-\frac{1}{\nu}}}{1-\frac{1}{\nu}}$$

→ New relationship between volatilities of c_t and θ_t

$$23.7\% \quad \sigma(\hat{\theta}_t) = \sqrt{\eta \cdot \sigma^2(\hat{c}_t) + \frac{1}{\nu^2} \sigma^2(\hat{l}_t) - 2 \frac{1}{\nu} \text{cov}(\hat{c}_t, \hat{l}_t)}$$

244.1 31.3

Consumption-Tightness Puzzle?

	$\sigma(\hat{\theta}_t)$
$\eta = 1$	9.5 %
$\eta = 2$	9.7 %
$\eta = 3$	10.1 %
$\eta = 4$	10.6 %
$\eta = 5$	11.2 %

Summary

1. Resurrected RBC with labor search and participation margin
 - Procyclical unemployment
 - Positively-sloped Beveridge curve
 - Decent cyclical volatilities
2. Participation elasticity matters for cyclical volatilities
3. Can contribute substantially to resolving the consumption-tightness puzzle.

Baseline Calibration: Quarterly

Parameter	Value	Target
A	1.0	normalization
v	0.064	$\sigma_{p/y} = 0.20$
ρ	0.765	data
σ_{ε}	0.83	data
χ	0.10	$f = 0.83, u = 5.5\%$
$\tilde{\beta}$	0.988	$\tilde{r} = 4.0\%$ annually
δ	0.031	$\frac{i}{y} = 0.25$
η	0.50	data range
μ	0.271	$\sigma_{w/y} = 0.42$
α	0.347	$\Pi_k = 34.74$
κ	0.16	data
m	0.62	$\theta = 1.8, f = 0.83$
$\frac{b}{w}$	0.939	$\Pi_{\text{labor}} = 0.64$

Sensitivity: Correlations

Baseline Results

Variable	Data	Target $\sigma_{p/y}$	Target $\sigma_{h/y}$	Veracierto
$\rho(u, y)$	-0.88	-0.85	-0.96	0.22
$\rho(u, v)$	-0.97	-0.49	-0.81	—
$\rho(u, h)$	-0.95	-0.96	-1.00	—
$\sigma_{\theta/z}$	19.1	13.2	18.1	—
$\sigma_{u/z}$	9.5	5.9	8.1	4.9 ¹⁾
$\sigma_{v/z}$	10.1	9.2	10.9	—
$\sigma_{c/y}$	0.61	0.29	0.27	0.31
$\sigma_{i/y}$	3.79	3.08	3.06	4.50
$\sigma_{h/y}$	0.60	0.44	0.36	0.56
$\sigma_{w/y}$	0.42	0.42	0.42	—
$\sigma_{p/y}$	0.20	0.20	—	0.58
μ	—	0.122	0.087	—
v	—	0.0058	—	—
$\frac{b}{w}$	—	0.956	0.970	—